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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF UTAH
BOARD OF EDUCATION OF
ALPINE SCHOOL DISTRICT,
Plaintiff-Appellant,

Case No. 19076

vs.
INDUSTRIAL COMMISSION OF
UTAH and WAYNE A. OLSEN,
Defendants-Respondents.
BRIEF OF PLAINTIFF
STATEMENT OF THE NATURE OF THE CASE
This

action involves a determination by the Industrial

Commission that defendant Olsen has sustained a

compensable

industrial injury, which determination is contested by plaintiff.
DISPOSITION OF THE CASE BEFORE THE INDUSTRIAL COMMISSION
This

case was

trative law
order

heard

by an

judge on October 1,

awarding

Industrial
1982.

Commission

On October

5,

adminis1982,

an

Defendant Olsen certain benefits was entered by

the Commission.
A Motion Requesting Transcript of Hearing and Extension of
Time
1982.

for

Filing of

Motion for

Review was

filed on October 20,

A Motion for Review was filed by the plaintiff-appellant

on December 10,

1982.

Appellant's Motion for Review was denied

an Order of the Industrial Commission of Utah dated February 24,
1983.

A Petition for Review was filed on March 23,

Supreme Court of the State of Utah.

1983 in the

RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL
Plaintiff seeks to have this Court determine that defenda·
Olsen

was

a

volunteer

and

not

an

employee

of

plaintiff

at

t·.

time he sustained his injury and that a volunteer is not entitle
to

compensation

benefits

under

the

Utah

Workmans

Compensate··

Act.
OF FACTS
Mr.

Wayne

contractor.
friend,

School
Olsen

In

Mr.

School,

A.

Olsen,
the

David

defendant-respondant,

fall

of

Haight,

a

1981,

shop

Mr.

teacher

about the possibility of using
to build

could

a

use

interfere 1,o,1ith

personal
the

the

project.

school's

is

Olsen
at

a

approache3 h:•

Mountain

equipment

Mr.

carpente:·

Vie1,o,1 P.i:·

at

the Hi:·

Haight agreed

equipment

so

long

as

that ,.,

he

didc.'·

( Transcrif'.

student's use of the equipment.

P· 5)
While
Haight

this

Olsen

informed Mr.

program
asked

Mr.

known

Mr.

Olsen

program.

volunteer
utilize

as

was

he

(Retired
would

community.

talents

(Transcript,

and
p.

a

p.

his

personal

Volunteer

interested
6)

project,

County sponsored

Senior

be

(Transcript,

program designed
their

on

Olsen about

RSVP
if

working

RSVP

in

is

a

voluntee·

Program),

a·

participating :·
County

sponso;•

to give opportunity to individuals·
experience

for

the

benefit

of t'•.

64)

This program is neither operate] nnr sp>11s•)rel by the• pla:
tiff

School

District.

The

Schnol

RSVP volunteers to volunteer the1 r

District.

(Transcript,

P· f,.J)

Distric-t
t imP

has

ci<irr>e·l

tri l ,_.:its

i

11

to

all

t lie S·:-•

In the spring of 1982,

Mr.

Olsen did not have any work in

his own business and he informed Mr.
interested

in

PP· 7,

Mr.

9)

participating

in

Haight that he would be

the RSVP program.

(Transcript,

Olsen was then interviewed by officials of Moun-

tain View High School and

informed that they would be happy to

have him participate in the volunteer program at the High School.
(Transcript,

p.

35)

At the conclusion of his interview, Mr.

Olsen understood that the program in which he would be participating was a volunteer program.

(Transcript, p. 35)

RSVP (County) personnel gave Mr. Olsen a lunch ticket which
entitled him to a daily lunch in the school cafeteria.
cript, p.

15)

(Trans-

Mr. Olsen was also allowed to continue to use the

in the school shop for personal projects so long as his
use did not interfere with the students.
Mr. Olsen did not have a written or oral contract of employment with Mountain View High School or Board of Education of
Alpine
receive

School

District.

35)

He did not

any wage or monetary remuneration for his

services nor

did he have any

(Transcript,

pp.

34,

expectation of being paid for his services.

(Transcript, pp. 36-40)
Neither the Board of Education of Alpine School District nor
Mountain View High School had any control over or right to control the hours that Mr.
no

hours.

Olsen spent in the high school.

He had

Mr. Olsen could come and go as he pleased.

(Transcript, p. 38)
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Neither the Board of Education of Alpine School District nor
Mountain view High School had any control over or right to control what Mr. Olsen told the students nor was he required to
attend faculty meetings.
In

April

(Transcript, pp. 38-39)

Mr.

1982,

Olsen was

asked by Mountain View High

School to substitute teach in the School Shop class for a period
of one day.

Prior to substitute teaching on that day, Mr. Olsen

signed the forms necessary to substitute teach for one day and at
the

end

of the day that he taught he signed a time card.

Olsen has been paid
teacher.

for

the day that he acted as

a

Mr.

substitute

(Transcript, p. 17)

On May 20,

1982 Mr.

Olsen suffered an accidental injury in

the Mountain View High School Shop.

Mr. Olsen's injury occurre8

during the lunch hour and while he was working on a personal
project.

(Transcript,

p.

22)

It is

for

this

injury that Mr.

Olsen seeks worker's compensation benefits.
ARGUMENT
POINT I
AT THE TIME OF HIS ACCIDENT, THE DEFENDANT, WAYNE A. OLSEK,
WAS A VOLUNTEER AND NOT AN EMPLOYEE OF THE BOARD OF EDUCATION OF
ALPINE SCHOOL DISTRICT.
Utah Code Ann.

35-1-45 provides that workmen's compensation

benefits shall be paid to "Every employee .

.who is injured

. by accident arising out of or in the course of his employ(emphasis added)

ment.

The term "employee" is defined by Utah Code Ann. 35-1-43 as:
(1)

Every

elective and appointive officer, anl
in the service of the stcite,
of any county, city, town or schr•nl <listrir-t

every other person,

or

within the state,

serving tf-1e stn.tP,
-4-

-it;.·,

town or school district therein under any election
or appointment or under any contract of hire,
exp:ess or implied, written or oral, including all
officers and employees of the state institutions
of learning.
The question of when one is an employee for workers compensation purposes has been dealt with in numerous Utah Supreme
Court decisions.

This question has generally been raised in the

context of cases dealing with the distinction between employees
and independent contractors; however, the same general legal
principles

apply to cases dealing with the distinction between

employees and volunteers.
In Bingham City Corporation,
sion of Utah,

66 Ut.

390,

243 P.

et al.,
113

v.

(1926),

Industrial Commisthe Utah Supreme

Court dealt with the distinction between employees and volunteers
for the first time.

In that case a volunteer fireman was killed

in the performance of his duties and the issue before the court
was whether or not the fireman was an employee of Bingham City.
In addressing this issue, the court set forth the following test:
The usual test by which to determine whether one
person is another's employee is whether the alleged employer possesses the power to control the
other person in respect to the services performed
by the latter and the power to discharge him for
disobedience or misconduct.
Under the Workmen's
Compensation Act it is also essential that some
consideration be in fact paid or payable to the
employee.
The purpose of the act is to provide
compensation for earning power, lost in industry,
and the only hasis for computing compensation is
the
ability of the employee in the particular employment out of which the loss arises.
In
short, the term employee indicates a person hired
to work for wa es as the em lo er ma
direct.
emphasis adCleri
p. 114.

-5-

Applying this test, the court held that the volunteer fireman was

not

an

employee and thus was

not entitled to benefits

under the Workers Compensation Act.
This test has been reiterated numerous times.
Young

&

Sons,

Inc.,

v.

Ashton,

Utah,

In Harry

538 P.2d 316

(1975),

L.

the

Utah Supreme Court stated:
Speaking in generality: an employee is one who is
hired and paid a salary, a wage, or at a fixed
rate, to perform the employer's work as directed
by the employer and who is subject to a comparatively high degree of control in performing those
duties.
p.318.
The intent of the parties is also one of the most important
factors to consider in attempting to determine whether or not an
employer-employee

relationship exists.

trial Commission, Utah,
In summary,

parties,

(2)

Indus-

562 P.2d 227 (1977).

the principal tests by which to determine whe-

ther the defendant
Alpine School

Rustler Lodge v.

is an employee of the Board of Education of

District or a

volunteer are

power or right to control,

and

( 1)

intent of the

(3) payment of corn-

pensation.
These tests will be treated in sequence.
INTENT
The clear intent of the parties was that the defendant was a
volunteer.
The
teacher,

defendant
were good

testified

that he

friends

and that

Haight was allowing the
his personal projects.

anJ

Mr.

in thP

Hai']ht,
fall

of

the

slier

19Rl

'Ir

to use the shnp ey 1iip:nent
WhilP

the

W'ciS

>A'

r'<1nl1

f

personal

project,

Mr.

Haight

told him about the RSVP

volunteer

program and asked the defendant if he would be interested in
participating

in

this

program.

The defendant

testified

as

follows:
MR. SHAUNHNESSY:
Q.
Now beginning in the winter
of 1981, were there discussions held about what
they called the RSVP program at the school?
A.
As I worked on this project last fall, Mr.
Haight informed me about the RSVP program.
A
volunteer instructor program of some sort, which
is offered by the District.
He explained to me
that they had a fellow who had been helping them
with this program. The program allowed the school
to bring in an individual to help them with the
instruction of regularly-scheduled classes for
high school students.
They had an individual who
was helping with that, but his health was kind of
poor and they didn't know whether he would be back
after Christmas. He asked me if I might be interested in helping them out that way.
I told him
that I didn't know what kind of work I would have
in my business, but that I would think about it
and let him know after Christmas."
(Transcript, pp. 6, 7)
The defendant then testified that after the Christmas break
he advised Mr.

Haight that he would be interested in participa-

ting in the volunteer program.
The

RSVP

program

is

a

(Transcript, p. 9)

county-sponsored volunteer program.

It is neither sponsored nor operated by the School District.
the request of the county,

At

the School District has agreed to

allow RSVP volunteers to volunteer services within the district.
After the defendant indicated that he was interested in
participating in the RSVP program,

Mr.

Haight advised the clai-

mant that it would be necessary to have him cleared by the school
ajrinistration.

"In case he punched a student or something,

(Transcript, pp. 9,54)

-7-

The

defendant

testified

that

meeting with the viae

in his

informed that the program in which he would be

principal he was
participating was

a

volunteer

program.

(Transcript,

p.

35)

He

stated his own understanding as follows:
Mr· McConkie:
Q.
So you understood at the conclusion of that interview that you would be working in the volunteer program of the high school?

A.

Yes.

(Transcript, p.

35)

CONTROL
The defendant presented no evidence whatsoever and there are
no Findings

of Fact that the School District had any control or

right to control his actions.

To the contrary,

the record shows

that the District did not have any power or right to control
defendant in respect to the services he performed.
The School District did not have any control over the hours
that he
could

spent at the school

come

keep a

and

go

as

he

(Transcript,
The

pleased.

p.

School

record of his activities or hours.

neither

record

keeping

nor

reporting

The

38).

District

did nc'.

The defendant hac
He

requirements.

wasn't

required to attend Faculty meetings.
The
not

have

defendant
any

(Transcript,

also

right

to

PP· 38,

39)

testified
control

that

what

the
he

School

taught

District die

the

sturlentS·

PAYMENT OF COMPENSATION
The
his

defendant did

services at

reporting

not

receive any wage or
N·• taxes

the High School.

requirements were pres< nt ·
0

-H-

remuner"1t ion fo1

were withheld and n

testified that he did not have any expectation of being paid for
his services.

(Transcript pp. 39,40)

The lunch ticket that defendant was given and which entitled
him to a

free

lunch

in the school cafeteria was an RSVP lunch

ticket and was given to him by RSVP personnel.

The School Dis-

trict had an agreement with RSVP that volunteers would be given a
free lunch so that volunteers wouldn't have to leave the facility
or bring their

lunch.

The school district testified that this

was just a gratuity for volunteer services.
In Hall v.
38 7 P. 2d 899
provision of

State Compensation Insurance Fund,

( 196 3),

154 Col. 47,

the Colorado Supreme Court held that the

lunch to a hospital volunteer worker did not make

the volunteer an employee.
In Kershaw v. Tracy Collins Bank & Trust Co., Utah, 561 P.2d
683 (1977) the court stated:
Purely voluntary services are not compensable and
services rendered out of a moral obligation are
not compensable.
Services rendered gratui taus ly
and without expectation by both parties that compensation be paid are not compensable.
p. 685.

The decision of the Industrial Commission that there was an
"implied contract of hire" between the Board of Education of
Alpine School District and the defendant, Wayne A. Olsen,

is

arhitrary, capricious, and is not supported in law or fact.
There

were

no

contractual

relations

whatever between

the

Board of Education of Alpine School District and the defendant .
The defendant testified that he did not have a "
c(1ntract

()f

any kind..

. written

" with the District and that he had not
-9-

even communicated with officials of the District until after his
accident.

(Transcript, p. 35)

He testified further that he had an agreement with officials
of Mountain View High School that he would be working in a volunteer

program.

In

this

regard,

the defendant testified as fol-

lows:
Mr. McConkie:
Q.
Did you have an oral contract
with the Alpine School District?
A.
Well, I had an agreement with the vice-principals, which I assume represent the school district.
Q.
Did you have any agreement with the school
district itself?
Officials of the school district?

A.

No.

Q.
Did you ever have any communications with
officials of the school district?

A.

Not until after my accident.

Q.
You say you had an agreement with the principal, or the vice-principal, at Mountain View High
School.
Would you describe briefly the agreement
that you had there?

A.
That just came about as a result of the interview which we have mentioned, wherein they ask me
personal questions, and ask for my qualifications
as a woodworker.
I don't remember that they asked
me anything about teaching background, but they
did want to know about my wood-working experience.
At the conclusion of this interview, they told mP
that they would be glad to have me work in this
volunteer program for the high school.
So you understood at the conclusic•n nf tlnt
interview that you would be working in the volunteer program of the high school?

Q.

A.

Yes.

(Transcript, p.35)
-1

I•-

In order to find that there was an implied contract between the
defendant and

the

school district,

all of the facts must be

examined to determine the intention of both parties.
Tracy Collins Bank & Trust Co., supra.

By

the

Kershaw v.

defendant's

own

admission, his understanding of his agreement reached with school
officials in his meeting was that he would be working in the
volunteer program of the high school.
In

Rasmussen v.

United States Steel Co.,

1

U.2d 291,

265

P.2d 1002 (1954) the Utah Supreme Court stated:
.the distinction between express and implied
in fact contracts largely is a difference only in
mode of expression.
A contract is express or
implied by reason of the expression of offer and
acceptance,--whether there is a manifestation of
mutual assent, by words or actions or both, which
reasonably are interpretable as indicating an
intention to make a bargain with certain terms or
terms which reasonably may be made certain.
The
elements are basically identical in both cases,
although the evidentiary facts may be expressed
differently."
p.1004.
In McCollum v.

Clothier,

121 Ut.

311,

241 P.2d 468

(1952),

the court restated the general quantum meruit or implied contract
rule as follows:

It is appreciated that this rule should not be
applied to bind one under implied contra7t who
merely permits services to be rendered him, or
accept benefits from another, under such circumstances that he may reasonably assume they are
given gratuitously.
The law_ should not
everyone to keep on guard against such possibilities hy warning persons offering services that no
pay is to be expected.
It is, th":'refore, .esser:t ial that the court should exercise caution in
imposing the obligations of implied contract,
as contrasted to express contract, where the
pint ies have actually defined and agreed to the
-11-

terms they are to be found by.
With such caution
in mind, the test for the court to apply was:
Under all the evidence, were the circumstances
such that the plaitiff could reasonably assume he
was to be paid and that the defendant should have
reasonably expected to pay for such services.
(Emphasis added)

p. 686.
The facts of this case are clear as to what the intention of
There was no legal duty on the part of one

the parties was.
party to the other.

In his Findings of Fact,

even the Admini-

strative Law Judge recognized the volunteer status of the defen.this case is an instance of first

dant when he stated that ".

impression in the State of Utah since it appears that there is no
provision
kers.

1

'

in

the

Worker's

(Findings of Fact,

Compensation

Act

for

volunteer wor-

Certainly the claimant has not

p.5)

shown by preponderance of the evidence that the parties intended
to create a master-servant or employee-employer relationship.
The claimant has testified that he worked for two days as a
substitute teacher and that he was only paid for the second day.
The first

occasion was around the first part of April,

1982 and

the second occasion was near the end of that same month.
first occasion,

it was necessary for the regular shop teacher to

take a few of his students on a field trip.
a

substitute

the

shop

teacher,

teacher

make

the

school

arrangements

tioned this to the defendant,

Rather than bring in

administration

school to cover his classes for him.

classes.

On the

with

other

requested
teachers

that

in the

When the shop teacher men-

the defendant offered to cover the

On the second occasion the defendant testifiel that

was formally asked to suhstitute teach anl that priGr
-12-

t

h•

tec;-hin-

he filled out necessary paper work in the school office.
fendant has been paid for the second day.

The de-

The claimant also tes-

tified that while substitute teaching, his duties were different
than they were on each of the other days that he served in the
school.

(Transcript, p. 42)

Assuming arguendo that the claimant did substitute teach for
two days,
district

this does not make the claimant an employee of the
for

all

other purposes

and all

other occasions.

The

most that can be said is that he was an employee on two separate
occasions of one day each.
The claimant's accident did not occur on either day that the
claimant claims he was substitute teaching and therefore did not
arise out of or in the course of his employment as required by
U.C.A. 35-1-45 (1953).
The only reasonable conclusion that can be reached
review of all

from a

of the facts and circumstances of this case,

in-

eluding the claimant's own admissions, is that the claimant was a
volunteer and

not an employee of the Alpine School District at

the time of his injury.
POINT II
WAYNE A. OLSEN, AS A VOLUNTEER WORKER, IS NOT
ENTITLED TO WORKERS COMPENSATION BENEFITS
The
fact

administrative

law

judge

took

judicial

notice

of

the

that the legislature in two separate instances has made

provisions for volunteer workers to receive workers compensation
benefits.

More

specifically,

wherein the legislature

he

referred

to U.C.A.

§49-6A-31

made provision for volunteer firemen to

workers compensation benefits and U.C.A. §63-34-11 (1953)

-13-

wherein

the

legislature

Department of
benefits.

Natural

Based

made

provision

Resources

upon

this,

for

volunteers with

to receive workers

the

administrative

the

compensation

law

judge

con-

cluded that i t is the intent of the legislature to extend workers
compensation

benefits

to

volunteers

who are

injured

during

the

course and scope of their voluntary labor.
In the

interpretation of statutes,

the

the all-important or controlling factor.
mary rule of construction of
the

intention

into effect.
P.2d 831

of

the

(1966).

Accordingly,

the pri-

is to ascertain and declare

legilsature,

Johnson v.

legislative will is

and

to

carry

State Tax Commission,

In Monson v.

Hall,

Utah,

such

intention

17 U.2d 337,

584 P.2d 833

411

(1978),

the Utah Supreme Court stated:
One of the cardinal rules of statutory construction requires construction with the objective of
bringing consonance to Constitutional and statutory provisions, which will be congruous with
expressed intent, and the applicability of the law
in general.
p.835.
Statutory provisions dealing with workers compensation benefits

for

National
pari

volunteer
Resources

materia

fragments

of

and

firemen,
and

other

therefore

law,

but

volunteers

as

workers

with

should

the
be

Department
regarded

should

not be considered as

whole,

or

a

nected, homogeneous system.

Statutes,

in

isolated

as parts of a great,

73 Am Jur 2d,

as

of

con-

§188.

A general principle of statutory interpretation is that the
mention of one thing implies the exclusion of another;
unius

est

exclusio alterius.

513 P.2d 18 (1973),

In

Knowles

v.

Holle\',

expressio
82

the Washington Supreme Court statei:

-14

W.

694,

If a statute specifically designates things or
of
upon which it operates, the
maxim
express10 unius est exclusio alterius"
gives rise to an inference that all things or
classes of things omitted from the statute were
intentionally omitted by the legislature.
pp.22,

23 (footnote).

Likewise, the Arizona Supreme Court in Inspiration Consolidated Copper v.

Industrial Commission,

118 Az.

10,

574 P.2d 478

stated:

(1977)

When a statute enumerates the subjects upon which
it is to operate, it will be construed as excluding from its effect all subjects not specifically
mentioned.
p.480.

In other words,

it must be presumed that the Utah Legisla-

ture considered the impact of the Utah Workers Compensation Act
upon volunteers and that they made a conscious decision to lessen
that

impact

upon

volunteer

firemen and volunteers working with

the Department of Natural Resources.

However,

under the maxim

stated above, it must be presumed that the legislature considered
other volunteers as well and made a determination not to provide
workers compensation benefits for all such volunteers.
CONCLUSION
The record is clear that the claimant is a volunteer and not
an employee of the Alpine School District.

The extention of

workers compensation benefits to all volunteers has serious impl ications

for school districts and other non-profit or charit-

able organizations who rely on volunteers for many services.
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We submit that only those volunteers specifically
in the Utah statutes should be entitled to receive workers cofl'pensation benefits.
Mr. Olsen has not met the burden of showing that he was
.injured.
his employment.

. by accident arising out of or in the course o'.
U .C .A. 35-1-45.

The decision of the Industrial Commission erroneously awarding him compensation in this case should be reversed and the
claim of Mr. Olsen should be dismissed.

Dated this

of May, 1983.

KIRTON, McCONKIE & BUSHNELL

David M. McConl<ie
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